Arctic Energy: Pathway to Conflict or Cooperation in the High North? by Hong, Nong
The melting of the Arctic ice cap in combination with developments elsewhere concerning future energy security are
creating scenarios that range from low level friction to potential conflict between the Arctic littoral states. Much attention
has been devoted to maritime boundary disputes involving the Arctic states: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the
US. In addition to this,  the emerging interest  of  non-Arctic  states in shipping,  polar research and non-living resource
exploitation also  adds uncertain  elements  to  the  Arctic  geopolitical  development.  Many Arctic  states’  populations are
skeptical about non-Arctic states’ intentions in the Arctic, thus raising such questions as, “Is China going to take away our
oil and gas from the Arctic to meet its energy needs?”, “Why are Japan and South Korea interested in observatory status
in the Arctic Council?”  Associated with these concerns is the essential question, “Is the energy factor a curse to Arctic
cooperation or an opportunity to a peaceful settlement of Arctic maritime disputes?”
Arctic geopolitics
During the Cold War, the Arctic was a security flashpoint with US and Soviet nuclear submarines patrolling under the North
Pole and bombers airborne over the region. Today, the Arctic is disassociated from great power politics. New concerns,
challenges and opportunities, however, are arising as the Arctic is perceived to be increasingly more accessible.
Countries with military/security interests and naval capacity in the Arctic are Russia, Canada, Norway, Denmark, and the
US. Russia has been the headline grabber with the Chilingarov expedition planting a Russian flag on the sea bed under
the North Pole and the resumption of bomber overflights in August 2007. Russian military interests center on the Kola
Peninsula, home to the Russian nuclear submarine fleet, and on rebuilding the Northern fleet. The US also released its
revised US Arctic Regional Policy in January 2009, which reiterated the importance of the Arctic for US national security
and defense. Denmark and Norway, which control Greenland and the Svalbard Islands, respectively, are also anxious to
establish their claims. For Greenland, which has just approved a new self government relationship with Denmark, the focus
is on developing a cooperative infrastructure in the Arctic, i.e., through the Arctic Council and the International Maritime
Organization (IMO). Greenland’s desire to have direct participation in the deliberations of Arctic states is complicated by
Danish policies, which are focused on Europe and can be at odds with the interests of Greenlanders. Canada is also
defending its political  interests, for example, by making vessel notifications in the Northwest Passage mandatory and
making clear it will not cede anything in the North. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, in July 2007, announced
funding for new Arctic naval patrol vessels, a new deep-water port, and a cold-weather training center along the Northwest
Passage.
There are also international governmental organizations and major powers from outside the region which take an interest
in the North. For example, the new Northern Dimension is interpreted to mean a common policy of the European Union
(EU), the Russian Federation, Iceland and Norway in Northern Europe. In addition, northern issues are finally being given
a higher priority on the EU’s agenda, and matters relating to the north have been an important concern of the United
Nations (UN) for years. For example, the UN has special duties in the region through the UN International Law of the Sea.
 
Major powers from outside the region, such as the UK, France, Germany, China, Japan and South Korea are taking a
growing interest in many aspects of the North, such as in scientific research. Finally, there is a growing worldwide, even
global, economic and political interest toward the northernmost regions of the globe, particularly due to estimated fossil
fuels  in  the  shelves  of  the  northern  seas  and  visions  of  new Trans-arctic  sea  routes.  Consequently,  trans-national
corporations (TNCs) have strong commercial interests to become present to utilize energy resources.
Arctic energy resources in perspective
The melting ice coverage has led some analysts to believe that previously inaccessible oil and gas deposits may now be
accessible permanently or periodically. Successful development of these reserves would help to alleviate the pressure on
the global oil and gas markets and potentially enhance energy security as a result.
 
While there are deposits of uranium and coal scattered throughout the area north of the Arctic Circle, the main energy
resources of interest for commercial operators are oil and gas. The precise quantities of these resources remain unknown.
However, a study conducted in 2008 by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) suggests the Arctic may contain
approximately 13% of the global mean estimate of undiscovered oil, which is approximately 618 billion barrels of oil (BBO). 
While the Eurasian side of the Arctic is more natural-gas-prone, the North American side is more oil-prone. The North
American  side  of  the  Arctic  is  estimated  to  have  about  65%  of  the  undiscovered  Arctic  oil,  but  only  26%  of  the
undiscovered Arctic natural gas.
The Arctic Alaska region, the Amerasia Basin, and the East Greenland Rift are expected to hold about 48.6 billion barrels
of undiscovered oil, which is about 54% of the total undiscovered Arctic oil. Approximately 2.5 billion barrels of oil have
already been discovered in large fields in both the Amerasia Basin and the Northwest Canadian Interior Basins that are not
yet being produced.
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The estimated amount of undiscovered gas is more significant — approximately three-times as much as the estimated oil
on an energy-equivalent basis. The median estimated amount represents some 30% of global estimated undiscovered
gas. Of course, the existence of these resources does not mean that they will all be exploited. Ultimately, this will most
likely be decided by the price of the resource weighed against the extraction, processing, and transportation costs of
getting it to market.
Current estimates of hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic vary between 3% and 25% of the world total. Most are likely
within established Russian territory, but the extent of deposits in disputed or international spaces is unclear, and the
viability of extraction depends on a host of shifting economic and technological variables.
Much attention has been devoted to maritime boundary disputes involving the Arctic states, Canada, Denmark, Norway,
Russia, and the US. Some analysts believe that the Arctic might witness conflicts between the littoral states caused by the
quest for energy resources.
The melting of the Arctic ice cap in combination with developments elsewhere concerning future energy security are
creating scenarios that range from low level friction to potential conflict between the eight nations surrounding the Arctic
region, which leads to the question under the legal framework: who owns the energy resources in the Arctic.
Legal aspects: who owns the Arctic’s energy resources?
With energy resource playing a significant role in the Arctic’s geopolitics, it is important to clarify the ownership of these
rich resources. To do that, an unfolding of the disputes among the Arctic states will help clear off the uncertainty.
A framework to resolve boundary disputes in the Arctic exists in the form of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS contains provisions regarding the delineation of the outer limits of continental shelves and
maritime  boundaries.  It  obliges  states  to  submit  their  boundary  claims  to  the  UN  Commission  on  the  Limits  of  the
Continental Shelf (CLCS) within ten years of ratifying UNCLOS. Russia, US, Canada, and Norway have all claimed a 12
nautical mile (nm) territorial sea and a 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Arctic Ocean. Like the EEZ, the
continental shelf automatically extends out to 200 nm, save for the need for a boundary with a neighboring State. The
international law on how to define a continental shelf beyond 200nm is found in Article 76 of UNCLOS. Within the extended
continental shelf, a State has sovereign rights on and under the seabed, including hydrocarbons (e.g., oil, gas, and gas
hydrates), minerals, etc.
 
Map 1: Russia in the High North
 
Source: US Department of State
 
Each of the five Arctic States has an Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) in the Arctic Ocean. Russia was the first to make a
submission to the Commission in December 2001. The Commission issued recommendations at its June 2002 meeting that
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included a recommendation that Russia make a revised submission that includes additional data for the central Arctic
Ocean (see Map 1 above). Russia is collecting and analyzing these data now. Norway has proceeded the farthest of any
Arctic State to define its ECS. It made a submission in 2006 that covers three areas – the Banana Hole, the Loop Hole,
and a small area north of Svalbard. The CLCS issued recommendations in March of 2009. Norway has publicly accepted
those recommendations (see Map 2 below).
 
 Map 2: Norwegian Areas of Interest in the High North
Source: US State Department
 
Canada has ECS in the central and western portions of the Arctic Ocean as well as off its East Coast. Canada has two
separate cooperative data collection efforts, one with Denmark (since 2005) on the Lomonosov Ridge and another with the
US (since 2008) on the Canada Basin and the Chukchi Borderland (see Map 3 below). Canada’s submission is due in July
2013. Denmark has ECS in five areas: two areas off  the Faroe Islands and three areas off Greenland (see Map 4).
Denmark’s submission is due in November 2014. The US has been gathering and analyzing data to determine the outer
limits of its extended continental shelf since 2002, but has been collecting data in the Arctic Ocean since 2003 (see Map
5).
 
Map 3: Canadian ECS
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Source: US Department of State
 
 
Map 4: Danish Effort in the High North
 
Source: US Department of State
 
 
 
Map 5: US Extended Continental Shelf Project
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Source:   Brian Van Pay, “National Maritime Claims in the Arctic” at “Changes in the Arctic Environment and the
Law of the Sea” The 33rd COLP Conference Seward, Alaska, May, 2009
 
Five Arctic states issued the Ilulissat Declaration on 28 May 2008, affirming that each state would remain committed to the
legal framework of the law of the sea to resolve any overlapping claims. The agreement by the Arctic states to resolve their
disputes through the UNCLOS framework suggests that the overlapping boundary issues will be settled amicably, although
it is likely that they will take some time to be finalized.
Article 136 of UNCLOS provides that the ‘Area’ beyond national jurisdiction and its resources are the common heritage of
mankind. No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area or its resources. All
rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the International Seabed Authority,
an autonomous international organization that administers mineral resources in the Area, shall act. The Non-Arctic States
and international organization can seek interests in the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources only in the
seabed beyond the jurisdiction of any Arctic States in this region. However, the general conduct of States in relation to the
Area shall be in accordance with the provisions of UNCLOS, the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations
and  other  rules  of  international  law  in  the  interests  of  maintaining  peace  and  security  and  promoting  international
cooperation and mutual understanding. It is clear that none of the non-Arctic states challenge the territorial claims in the
Arctic  and the related claims for  jurisdiction rights.  It  does appear that  UNCLOS must  be interpreted in the broader
perspective of humankind.
Challenge and cooperation in energy development
Political challenge for oil companies that show interest in energy extraction may stem from unresolved boundary disputes.
Besides, the opening up of Arctic sea routes once only navigable by icebreakers threaten to complicate delicate relations
between countries with competing claims to Arctic territory — particularly as once inaccessible areas become ripe for
exploration for oil and natural gas. The United States, Russia and Canada are among the countries attempting to claim
jurisdiction over Arctic territory alongside Nordic nations.
 
Analysts say Japan, South Korea and China are also likely to join a rush to capture oil and gas trapped under the region's
ice. The Arctic states are very concerned about these non-Arctic States’ position on Arctic status. It is clear that China has
an agenda and is looking to use existing regimes to advance its interests at the multilateral and bilateral level. China has
recently entered into bilateral discussions with both Norway and Canada. Due to China’s fast economic growth and military
capacity building, suspicions about China’s intentions in the Arctic also arise, driven by what Western analysts call the
‘China Threat Theory’, though China defends with the ‘Peaceful Development Theory’. Although Hu Zhengyue, Chinese
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, has said ‘China does not have an Arctic strategy’, China does appear to have a clear
agenda regarding the Arctic. In his speech at Svalbard, Hu acknowledged that the Arctic is mainly a regional issue but said
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that it is also an inter-regional issue due to climate change and international shipping. Unsurprisingly, China would like to
see the Arctic states recognize the interests of non-Arctic states (Ning, X., ‘di qui wei lai de suo yin: wai jiao bu bu zhang
zhu li tan ‘bei ji yjan jiu zhi lv’”  [A microcosm of the world’s future—Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs talks about ‘High
North Study Tour’], Shijie Bolan, vol. 349, no. 19 (2009), p. 58).
 
Economic challenges also exist. Finding large Arctic oil and natural gas deposits is difficult and expensive; developing
them as  commercially  viable  ventures is  even more challenging.  Arctic  oil  and natural  gas resource exploration and
development are expensive because of the challenges from harsh winter weather that requires that the equipment be
specially  designed  to  withstand  frigid  temperatures,  limited  transportation  access  and  long  supply  lines  that  reduce
transportation options and increase transportation costs, physical environment that requires additional site preparation to
prevent equipment and structures from skinning, and operating costs that are increased by the ice-pack conditions that
extend over much of the Arctic Ocean. In addition, while the Arctic has the potential to be a more important source of global
oil and natural gas production sometime in the future, the timing of a significant expansion in Arctic production is difficult to
predict. Statoil, a global energy company, announced in April that it had made the most significant discovery off Norway in
the past decade at its Skrugard prospect in the western Barents, breathing new life into Norway's hitherto declining oil
prospects. But producing oil and gas in Norway's remote "High North" might entail higher costs and possibly greater risk of
spills.
 
In addition to political and economic challenges, technological concerns should not be neglected, as the feasibility and
thus the cost of extracting oil and gas in the Arctic will depend heavily on the state of the available technology as well as
climatic  developments  which  may  produce  a  more  or  less  hospitable  environment  in  which  to  operate.  Extraction
technology has been grappling with extreme-climate marine drilling for decades, but the pace of new advancements will
dictate the feasibility of exploitation in coming years.
 
It is more challenging to forecast the level of offshore hydrocarbon extraction in the future. As noted, operating in the Arctic
environment is made more challenging by the presence of ice and the generally severe weather conditions. In order to
manage the risk that flows from these conditions, hydrocarbon extraction operations must design safety and protection into
their infrastructure and procedures. Moreover, given the more fragile nature of the Arctic environment in comparison to
other hydrocarbon producing areas of the world, companies will  be expected to operate with increased environmental
safeguards in the Arctic. Together, these higher standards will  result in increased operating costs for the oil  and gas
companies. These costs may convince some companies that the potential gains are not worth the risks of investing in the
region.
 
Opportunity for cooperation
The high cost of doing business in the Arctic suggests that only the world’s largest oil companies, most likely as partners in
joint  venture projects,  have the financial,  technical,  and managerial  strength to  accomplish the costly,  long-lead-time
projects dictated by Arctic conditions. Incentives to settle outstanding disputes would rise with the increasing potential
economic returns posed by exploitation and the resulting polarization within the international system.
While there are disagreements between the Arctic states on maritime boundaries, there are still reasons to believe that
these disagreements can be resolved amicably. The prospect for conflicts relating to unresolved boundary disputes seems
remote. The existing vehicles for dispute resolution and cooperation in the region, UNCLOS and the Arctic Council, will
also help to reduce tensions.
Joint management of resource fields is another option that might come into play as countries involved in a dispute might
see more advantage in approaching the disagreement this way rather than losing a claim in an international tribunal.
Cooperation between Norway and Iceland regarding the development of the Dreki field could serve as a model for similar
arrangements  in  the  future.  Another  example is  the  continental  shelf  dispute concerning an area rich in  natural  gas
between Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea. Both countries dispute the other's interpretation of where their borders
extend into the offshore EEZ. While it is possible that there could be a conflict between the two countries over this area, it
seems highly unlikely given the potential costs versus the potential benefits.
 
Geopolitical issues are not exclusively conflicts over interests, although such concerns tend to dominate. They can also
reflect cooperative, multilateral initiatives by which a state pursues its interests vis-à-vis others. Such cooperative ventures
are often considered desirable and even unavoidable when a state is seeking a result that cannot be achieved unilaterally.
At  the same time, cooperation frequently establishes a level  of  governance – in some cases formally,  in  others less
formally – by which mutual understanding can clarify intentions and help to build trust.
 
Recognizing and respecting each others rights constitutes the legal basis for cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic
states.  In  accordance  with  UNCLOS  and  other  relevant  international  laws,  Arctic  states  have  sovereign  rights  and
jurisdiction in their  respective areas in the region, while non-Arctic states also enjoy rights of  scientific  research and
navigation. To develop a partnership of cooperation, Arctic and non-Arctic states should, first and foremost, recognize and
respect each other's rights under the international law. Examples between Arctic and non-Arctic states are there. On 22
November 2010, the Sovcomflot  Group (SCF) and China National  Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a strategic
long-term cooperation agreement. The parties agreed to develop a long-term partnership in the sphere of seaborne energy
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solutions, with the SCF fleet serving the continually growing Chinese imports of hydrocarbons. Taking into account the
significant experience gained by Sovcomflot in developing the transportation of hydrocarbons in the Arctic seas, SCF and
CNPC agreed upon the format for coordination in utilizing the transportation potential of the Northern Sea Route along
Russia’s Arctic coast, both for delivering transit shipments of hydrocarbons and for the transportation of oil and gas from
Russia’s developing Arctic offshore fields to China. A new fleet of tankers designed to operate in ice as well as additional
heavy-duty ice breakers will be built to that end. South Korea´s Samsung Industries is looking into filling the technological
gap to make it possible to deliver Arctic natural gas across the pacific ocean to East Asia. Russia is building massive
duel-bowed oil tankers that are set to come into use as soon as next year. While traveling forward, the ships move as they
normally would through open water. But when the vessels move backward, they can act as ice-breakers. Construction is
underway on two 70,000-tonne ships and two more 125,000 tonne ships and there are rumors that another five are on
order.
Conclusion
The Arctic has recently witnessed a manifold growth in its geostrategic importance due to the huge deposit of oil and
natural gas, and the potential contribution of northern sea routes for global shipping. As a result of this, northern regions
and seas have become a target area for the growing economic, political and military interests of the Arctic states as well as
of major powers outside the region and trans-national companies.
While it is important to look at the Arctic issue from a law of the sea perspective, with the Arctic states resorting to the
Commission of Limits of Continental Shelf (CLCS) for advice on the outer limit of continental shelf, and major powers,
transnational  corporations are seeking chances to develop the region within the framework of a 'common heritage of
mankind' beyond national jurisdictions; political,  economic and technological concerns also challenge oil  companies in
further investment in energy development in the Arctic. By the same token, however, joint management of resources is
another option that might come into play as countries involved in a dispute might see more advantage in approaching the
disagreement this way rather than losing a claim in a zero-sum game. The energy factor, rather than a curse for the Arctic,
could serve as an opportunity for regional cooperation in the region.   
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